



Security and Emergency Preparedness


THE CHALLENGE

Southern California is home to significant threats; including earthquakes, tsunamis, wildfires, flooding and mudslides. More recently, terrorism has been added to the threats that the region must prepare against. The complexity of the SCAG region, with a range of potential terrorism targets, presents significant challenges in coordinating and implementing effective homeland security programs. The unexpected and complex nature of these natural and human-caused incidents require extensive coordination, collaboration and flexibility among all of the agencies and organizations involved in planning, mitigation, response and recovery. It should be noted that **safety** is defined as the protection of persons and property from unintentional damage or destruction caused by accidental or natural events. **Security** is defined as the protection of persons or property from intentional damage or destruction caused by vandalism, criminal activity or terrorist attacks. The Transportation Research Board has classified emergency events that affect transportation agencies into several categories, which is illustrated below in **Table 9.1**.

The interdependency of the jurisdictions and organizations makes regional cooperation and coordination essential to security and emergency preparedness. No significant event is

truly local, as political boundaries are permeable and critical local infrastructure may serve the entire region. No jurisdiction stands alone. A high-risk, well-resourced municipality may be as dependent on a smaller jurisdiction for support in an emergency as a smaller jurisdiction may be on a larger one. Typically, no single agency is responsible for transportation security. At the local level, especially within transit agencies, safety may be handled within one office. However, it is far less likely that the security of a surface transportation mode is managed by one entity and that this entity is even controlled by the transportation organization. For example, highways and transit networks traverse multiple police jurisdictions, local fire departments generally fill the incident command role after terrorist events, regional command and control centers respond to both natural and intentional disasters, and federal agencies intervene as needed and based on specific guidelines such as the crossing of state boundaries.

A proactive region that improves its homeland security programs and prepares for emergencies is better insulated against the economic, public health, transportation, and other impacts from natural and human-caused accidents. When a disaster occurs, there is a cascading effect on the transportation, utilities, communications, fuel, and water infrastructure services



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and delivery systems that we depend on. When one of these critical elements in our support system breaks down, it has a domino effect on other elements. When multiple elements break down, the effect can be crippling. Some of the ways in which the infrastructure can be affected in a disaster or emergency and effects on emergency service providers are shown in **Tables 9.2 and 9.3.**

A continuing, cooperative and collective regional effort will be needed to assist the region in the planning, preparation and response to emergencies, whether caused by natural or human elements. To assist in this effort, this chapter identifies SCAG's potential role and responsibility in regards to the

relationship between transportation and emergency preparedness. It describes the current programs at the federal, State and local levels; identifies security issues in the transportation infrastructure; and recommends policies for SCAG and other stakeholders.

The continued emphasis on enhancing transportation security is also reflected in the most recent transportation authorization bill, known as SAFETEA-LU (Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act – A Legacy for Users). SAFETEA-LU specifies that Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPO) such as SCAG develop a metropolitan planning process that provides consideration for projects and

TABLE 9.1 EMERGENCY EVENTS IMPACTING TRANSPORTATION AGENCIES¹

Naturally Occurring	Human Caused	
	Intentional	Non-Intentional
Droughts Dust/Wind Storms Earthquakes Electrical Storms Floods High Winds Hurricanes Ice Storms Landslides Naturally Occurring Epidemics Snowstorms and Blizzards Tornadoes Tropical Storms Tsunamis Wildfires	Bomb Threats and Other Threats of Violence Disruption of Supply Sources Fire/Arson Fraud/Embezzlement Labor Disputes/Strikes Misuse of Resources Riot/Civil Disorder Sabotage: External and Internal Actors Security Breaches Terrorist Assaults Using Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear Agents Terrorist Assaults Using Explosives, Firearms, or Conventional Weapons Theft Vandalism War Workplace Violence Cyber Attacks	Accidental Contamination or Hazardous Materials Spills Accidental Damage to or Destruction of Physical Plant and Assets Accidents That Affect the Transportation System Gas Outages Human Errors HVAC System Failures or Malfunctions Inappropriate Training on Emergency Procedures Power Outages Software/Hardware Failures or Malfunctions Unavailability of Key Personnel Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) Failure or Malfunction Voice and Data Telecommunications Failures or Malfunctions Water Outages

strategies that will “increase the security of the transportation system for motorized and non-motorized users.”

THE PLAN

This chapter of the RCP aims to achieve and sustain risk-based target levels of capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major human- caused or natural events in order to minimize the threat and impact to lives, property and the regional economy. This centers around coordinating the numerous plans, programs, organizations and infrastructure in place within the SCAG region to provide safety and security of the regional transportation system for many potential situations.

SCAG's role in homeland security is based on the potential role of a MPO in relationship to six phases of an incident/ disaster:²

- **Prevention:** Stopping an attack before it occurs; improved facility design; surveillance, monitoring
- **Response/Mitigation:** Reducing impacts of an attack; evacuation; identifying best routes; effective communication system
- **Monitoring:** Monitoring and evaluating incidents; surveillance, monitoring, sensing, public information
- **Recovery:** Facilitating and reconstruction, restoring operation of transportation system
- **Investigation:** Determination of causes, and responsible parties; security/police activity
- **Institutional Learning:** Self-assessment of actions; feedback to prevention element

TABLE 9.2 POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF DAMAGE TO INFRASTRUCTURE³

Service	Effect
Transportation	Inability to get emergency service personnel into the affected area. Inability to transport victims away from the area.
Electrical	Increased risk of fire and electrical shock. Possible disruption to transportation system if downed lines are across roads.
Telephone	Lost contact between victims, service providers, and family members. System overload due to calls from or to friends or relatives.
Water	Disruption of service to homes, businesses, and medical providers. Inadequate water supply for firefighting. Increased risk to public health if there is extensive damage to the water supply or if it becomes contaminated.
Fuel Supplies	Increased risk of fire or explosion from ruptured fuel lines. Risk of asphyxiation from natural gas leaks in confined areas.



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Because of its traditional role as the MPO for the six-county Southern California region, SCAG is best suited to provide a forum where plans and data can be developed and coordinated with other regional planning efforts; and work towards developing regional consensus, but not be responsible for operation and implementation of plans and programs. SCAG should play a lead role in some areas, a minor role in others, or play no role at all. For example, SCAG has almost no role in the investigation aspect of security, only a minor role; as champion, in the recovery phase; but should play a lead role in championing and convening prevention and developing the institutional learning. SCAG could play a significant role in helping the region coordinate planning in preparation and anticipation of

potential future incidents; and coordinate public information dissemination strategies.

This enhanced leadership and data provision role is designed to support federal, state and local security and emergency responders. The RCP proposes that SCAG coordinate more with these front-line responders to ensure that planning and information are available to help the region deal with inevitable emergencies.

The recommended policies of this plan are also designed to urge transportation planning agencies to devote adequate funding to the operations and maintenance of our aging transportation system. Failing infrastructure is often the result of insufficient roadway, bridge, and transit system maintenance due to lack

TABLE 9.3 POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF DAMAGE ON EMERGENCY SERVICE PROVIDERS³

Type of Damage	Effect
Roadways, Bridges, Tunnels, Interchanges	Inability to assess damage accurately. Ambulances prevented from reaching victims and/or victims prevented from reaching emergency medical services. Police prevented from reaching areas of civil unrest. Fire departments prevented from getting to fires. Flow of needed supplies is interrupted. Inability to deploy assets as part of incident response and to manage transportation flows Inability for emergency service providers to manage an evacuation
Structural	Damaged hospitals unable to receive patients. Increased risk of damage from falling debris.
Disrupted Communication	Victims unable to call for help. Coordination of services is hampered. Inability for incident command structure to receive real time situational information, reducing its effectiveness
Fuel Line Damage	Fire and paramedic services overburdened. Inability to sustain emergency response and recovery
Disrupted Water Service	Firefighting capabilities restricted. Medical facilities hampered.

of funding or other resources. While not as glamorous as earmarking funding for roadway and transit system expansions, our region must improve its commitment to ensuring that the existing transportation system is safe and secure from natural and man-made incidents. To that end, the RCP recommends that SCAG work with partner agencies, federal, state and local jurisdictions to find opportunities to leverage and effectively utilize transportation and public safety/security resources in support of this effort.

Table 9.4 highlights SCAG's role in responding to specific threats to the region.

Earthquakes. The most likely threat to the region is one we have faced many times in varying severity, the earthquake. The 1971 Sylmar earthquake and the 1994 Northridge trembler caused significant transportation damages to the region. An even greater earthquake in the SCAG region is not just a statistical possibility, but a certainty.

TABLE 9.4 SCAG ROLE IN SECURITY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Incident Phase	Traditional	Convener	Champion	Developer	Operator
Prevention	•	☑	☑	•	☒
Response/Mitigation	•	☑	☑	•	•
Monitoring/Information	•	☑	☑	•	☒
Recovery	•	☑	•	☒	☒
Investigation	•	☒	☒	☒	☒
Institutional Learning	☑	☑	☑	☑	☑

No Role ☒

Minor Role •

Lead Role ☑

Roles:

Traditional	Help manage the system management and operations role in the ongoing transportation planning activities. The primary responsibility for projects rests elsewhere.
Convener	The MPO acts as a forum where operations plans can be discussed and coordinated with other plans in the region, still not responsible for operation and implementation.
Champion	The MPO works aggressively to develop regional consensus on operations planning. MPO planners develop programs and projects and the MPO takes the lead in developing regional agreements on coordinated operations.
Developer	MPO develops regional operation plans and incorporates operations strategies into the transportation plan. System-oriented performance measures would be used to identify strategic operations gaps in the transportation system.
Operator	The MPO would be responsible for implementing operations strategies that were developed as part of the MPO-led planning process.



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SCAG's role in an earthquake would be based on the severity of the earthquake. For smaller earthquakes, SCAG would work with local agencies to program transportation infrastructure repairs.

For moderate earthquakes, SCAG would work with the State and federal government to "fast track" the programming of transportation infrastructure repairs.

For significant earthquakes, SCAG would provide GeoData to responders to help identify transit dependent areas for rescue and evacuation, and critical transportation infrastructure that would need to be repaired to most efficiently help in the relief and recovery efforts. SCAG should maintain mutual aid agreements with other metropolitan areas in the event the organization is disabled by the event, maintaining the flow of data to responders.

There is a danger that an earthquake or series of earthquakes may cause water retention facilities to fail. Dam owners are required by California Regulations to provide a technical study and an inundation map, showing the area downstream of a dam that would be inundated or otherwise affected by the failure of the dam and accompanying large flood flows.

Based upon a review of inundation maps or based upon information gained by an on-site inspection and consultation with the affected local jurisdiction (when the requirement for an inundation map is waived), the Office of Emergency Services shall determine and designate areas where death or personal

injury would, likely result from the partial or total failure of a dam. The appropriate public safety agencies of any city, county, or city and county, the territory of which includes any of those areas, may adopt emergency procedures for the evacuation and control of populated areas below those dams.⁴

Tsunamis. Tsunamis, while less frequent than earthquakes, have happened in the past, and will likely happen in the future. An August 31, 1930 tsunami resulted in a three meter run-up (maximum vertical elevation wave reached above sea level at the time of tsunami) wave observed in Santa Monica bay. One man drowned and several swimmers required rescuing.

Even small tsunamis can be dangerous, producing dangerous undertows that can drown swimmers, rip ships from their moorings and damage low lying structures.

While development along the coast would be affected, based on the size of the waves, the greatest threatened areas would be the ports of Long Beach (POLB) and Los Angeles (POLA), which have a dock height of only a few feet above the high tide line.

The major sources of tsunami energy reaching the POLA and the POLB are from the northern regions offshore of Alaska and from southern regions near Chile. Tsunamis from great earthquakes in the Far East do not appear to impact the Ports as much as those from generation regions in the north and the south.⁵

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REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE PLAN

In the event of a tsunami, SCAG would work with the State and Federal government to “fast track” the programming of transportation infrastructure repairs.

Flooding. Much of the SCAG region is composed of alluvial fans, gently sloping landforms created over time from the erosion of the surrounding mountains. Flooding, even though characterized by shallow depth, can be quite destructive, traveling at relatively high speed and carrying sediment and debris.

In 1938, after a tremendous flood that killed 113 people, the Army Corps of Engineers began channelizing the major rivers in Los Angeles County, developing six catch basins and 14 smaller mountain dams in an effort to reduce flooding. While flooding has not been eliminated, the impacts in urban areas of Los Angeles County have been reduced.

Since then, the regional population has grown significantly into the Inland Empire and North Los Angeles County. Many of the alluvial floodplains in these areas have been developed, primarily with residential housing. Droughts and wildfires increase the risk of flash floods and mudslides during rain storms.

The combination of damaged hillsides, alluvial fans and inclement weather allow some degree of accuracy in predicting danger areas for flooding, allowing precautionary evacuations and road closures.

In the event that flooding damages transportation infrastructure, SCAG would work with the State and federal government to “fast track” the programming of transportation infrastructure repairs.

Security and Emergency Preparedness Goals

- Ensure transportation safety, security, and reliability for all people and goods in the region.
- Prevent, protect, respond to, and recover from major human-caused or natural events in order to minimize the threat and impact to lives, property, the transportation network and the regional economy.

Security and Emergency Preparedness Outcomes

- Increase per capita funding by 2012 for transportation system maintenance and preservation programs over 2007 levels.
- Increase per capita funding for Intelligent Transportation Systems projects that enhance or benefit regional transportation security.
- 100 percent of government agencies and organizations involved in planning, mitigation, response and recovery involved in improving emergency preparedness coordination, collaboration and flexibility.



SECURITY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

SECURITY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ACTION PLAN

IGR/Best Practices	Legislation	Coordination	Constrained Policies	Potential for Direct/Indirect Benefits								Other Benefits		
				Land Use	Transportation	Air Quality	Water	Energy	Open Space	Economy	Security	Solid Waste	Public Health	Climate Change
SCAG Policies (SCAG policies shall be subject to consideration for future Overall Work Plans)														
		X	SEP-1 SCAG shall help ensure the rapid repair of transportation infrastructure in the event of an emergency.		X					X	X		X	
		X	SEP-1.1 SCAG, in cooperation with local and state agencies, shall identify critical infrastructure needs necessary for: a) emergency responders to enter the region, b) evacuation of affected facilities, and c) restoration of utilities.		X		X	X		X	X		X	
		X	SEP-1.2 SCAG, in cooperation with CTCs, California and the federal Government, shall develop a transportation recovery plan for the emergency awarding of contracts to rapidly and efficiently repair damaged infrastructure.		X					X	X			
		X	SEP-2 SCAG shall continue to deploy and promote the use of intelligent transportation system (ITS) technologies that enhance transportation security and reduce air pollution.		X	X		X		X	X		X	
		X	SEP-2.1 SCAG shall work to expand the use of ITS to improve surveillance, monitoring and distress notification systems and to assist in the rapid evacuation of disaster areas.		X						X			
		X	SEP-2.2 SCAG shall incorporate security into the Regional ITS Architecture.		X						X			
X			SEP-3 SCAG shall establish transportation infrastructure practices that promote and enhance security.		X						X			
X			SEP-3.1 SCAG shall work with transportation operators to plan and coordinate transportation projects, as appropriate, with Department of Homeland Security grant projects, to enhance the regional transit security strategy (RTSS).		X						X		X	
X			SEP-3.2 SCAG shall encourage transportation infrastructure practices that identify and prioritize the design, retrofit, hardening, and stabilization of critical transportation infrastructure to prevent failure, to minimize loss of life and property, injuries, and avoid long term economic disruption.		X					X	X		X	
		X	SEP-3.3 SCAG shall establish a Transportation Security Working Group (TSWG) with goals of RTP consistency with RTSS, and to find ways SCAG programs can enhance RTSS.		X						X		X	
		X	SEP-4 SCAG shall establish a forum where policy makers can be educated and regional policy can be developed.								X			
		X	SEP-4.1 SCAG shall work with local officials to develop regional consensus on regional transportation safety, security, and safety-security policies.								X			

IGR/Best Practices	Legis lation	Coordination	Constrained Policies	Potential for Direct/Indirect Benefits								Other Benefits	
				Land Use	Transportation	Air Quality	Water	Energy	Open Space	Economy	Security	Solid Waste	Public Health
		X	SEP-5 SCAG shall help to enhance the region's ability to deter and respond to acts of terrorism, human-made or natural disasters through regionally cooperative and collaborative strategies by:							X			
		X	SEP-5.1 Working with local officials to develop regional consensus on regional transportation safety, security, and safety-security policies.							X			
		X	SEP-6 SCAG shall help to enhance the region's ability to deter and respond to terrorist incidents, human-made or natural disasters by strengthening relationship and coordination with transportation.		X					X			
		X	SEP-6.1 SCAG shall encourage all SCAG elected officials are educated in the National Incident Management System (NIMS).							X			
		X	SEP-6.2 SCAG shall work with partner agencies, federal, state and local jurisdictions to improve communications and interoperability and to find opportunities to leverage and effectively utilize transportation and public safety/security resources in support of this effort.		X					X			
		X	SEP-7 SCAG shall work to enhance emergency preparedness awareness among public agencies and with the public at-large.							X			
		X	SEP-8 SCAG shall work to improve the effectiveness of regional plans by maximizing the sharing and coordination of resources that would allow for proper response by public agencies by:							X			
		X	SEP-8.1 Encouraging and providing a forum for local jurisdictions to develop mutual aid agreements for essential government services during any incident recovery, particularly for those issues that are multi-county.							X			
		X	SEP-9 SCAG shall help to enhance the capabilities of local and regional organizations, including first responders, through provision and sharing of information by:							X		X	
		X	SEP-9.1 Working with local agencies to collect regional GeoData in a common format, and provide access to the GeoData for emergency planning, training and response.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
		X	SEP-9.2 Establishing a forum for cooperation and coordination of these plans and programs among the regional partners including first responders and operations agencies.							X			
		X	SEP-9.3 Developing and establishing a regional information sharing strategy, linking SCAG and its member jurisdictions for ongoing sharing and provision of information pertaining to the region's transportation system and other critical infrastructure.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
		X	SEP-10 SCAG shall provide the means for collaboration in planning, communication, and information-sharing before, during, or after a regional emergency by:							X		X	

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SECURITY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

IGR/Best Practices	Legislation	Coordination	Constrained Policies	Potential for Direct/Indirect Benefits								Other Benefits	
				Land Use	Transportation	Air Quality	Water	Energy	Open Space	Economy	Security	Solid Waste	Public Health
X			SEP-10.1 Developing and incorporating strategies and actions pertaining to response and prevention of security incidents and events as part of the ongoing regional planning activities.							X			
		X	SEP-10.2 Offering a regional repository of GIS data for use by local agencies in emergency planning, and response, in a standardized format.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
		X	SEP-10.3 Entering into mutual aid agreements with other MPOs to provide data sharing in the event that SCAG is no longer able to function due to an incident.							X			

¹ National Cooperative Highway Research Program Report 525 Volume 9 "Guidelines for Transportation Emergency Training Exercises" McCormick Taylor Inc. 2006

² Michael D. Meyer, Ph.D, P.E., Georgia Institute of Technology: The Role of the Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) in Preparing for Security Incidents and Transportation System Response.

³ Federal Emergency Management Agency: Community Emergency Response Team (IG-317) Student's Guide

⁴ California Government Code Section 8589.5

⁵ Tsunami Hazard Assessment For The Ports Of Long Beach And Los Angeles, (Moffatt and Nichol) 1997. http://www.portoflosangeles.org/DOC/REPORT_Tsunami_%20April_2007.pdf

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